From Barrington, Herron, and Silver: The Motherland is Calling: Views of Homeland among Russians in the Near Abroad:
"While national identity may or may not be based on ethnicity, it always contains a territorial component. An ethnic group becomes 'national' when it recognizes a particular territory as one that has a right to control politically. The development of a sense of homeland an an emotional attachment to that homeland coincides with the development of national self-consciousness. Scholars have asserted that 'for a nation to exist, it must have some place that it can claim its own' and 'nations cannot be conceived without a specific territory or homeland.' Thus, to understand a particular group's idea of homeland one must understand its political and social conduct and its relations with a national 'other.'
"An individual or group can have several possible homelands. The first is an external homeland, in which case a minority does not consider any part of its state of residence to be its homeland but instead views some region or state outside its country of residence as the group's true homeland... Such a situation would not ordinarily fuel secessionist claims, though it could lead the government of the external homeland to intervene on behalf of the minority group. If there is a legitimate basis for claims of discrimination, the external homeland may put diplomatic, economic, or military pressure on the minority's state of residence to protect the minority from discrimination.
"The second possible homeland is internal - a part of the state of residence. This perception of homeland is generally associated with a state that contains a sizable and concentrated ethnic minority. The minority considers a region to be its national homeland and desires political control over that territory. Such situations fuel secessionist drives and are at the heart of many ethnic conflicts around the world because what is seen as a homeland by the minority is often the perceived homeland of the majority group. This situation of overlapping homelands is common in the former Soviet Union, especially where regions within the existing successor states are named for a particular ethnic minority (for example, Chechnya within Russia and Abkhazia within Georgia).
"The third type of homeland is best called the mixed (internal-external) homeland. In this situation, members of a minority in one state see the homeland as comprising both a part of the state of residence and an external region or state. Such views of homeland can result in irredentism, in which members of an ethnic minority support the secession of a region of their state of residence and its joining with a neighboring state. An oft-mentioned example is Kazakhstan, where Russians consider both the northern part of the country and Russia as their homeland. In such situations, nationalist claims take the form of a desire to break part of the state of residence away and to join with the rest of the homeland group.
"The fourth homeland option is also internal but with different implication from those of the internal variant discussed above. Members of an ethnic minority may see their entire state of residence as their homeland. This possibility is rarely discussed in works on the intersection of minorities, identity, and territory. Since it is assumed that to be a nation requires a homeland different from that which another nation can claim, it follows that by definition 'national minorities' would not consider their state of current residence to be their homeland. Whereas national minorities (as the term is understood by scholars of nationalism) may not accept their state of residence as their homeland, ethnic minorities may."
Barrington, Lowell W., Erik S. Herron, and Brian D. Silver. "The Motherland is Calling: Views of Homeland among Russians in the Near Abroad." World Politics 55 (January 2003), 290-313.
Saturday, March 17, 2007
Marc Morje Howard on Civil Society in Post-Communist Countries
"What should we expect to find ten years from now? Will levels of membership and participation gradually increase, at least in some countries, and if so, how?"
"The first and most obvious potential mechanism is generational change, as younger post communist citizens less influenced by the experience of life in a communist system come of age. A group of people roughly the same age can be shaped not only by their common age or geography but by 'significant social events' such as war or economic depression. Piotr Sztompka argues that 'as long as the majority of the population consists of the people whose young, formative years, and therefore crucial socializing experiences fall under the rule of the communist regime-- one can expect the continuing vitality of the bloc culture.' He adds, however that this will change over time, as 'new demographic cohorts replace the older generations at the central positions in a society.' The expectation therefore is that those people who dislike and avoid voluntary organizations will eventually die off, replaced by younger generations that might be more sympathetic to such activities.
"The expectation that generational change will bring about a steady increase in organizational membership is certainly plausible (although not particularly encouraging, since even in the best conditions, it will take many decades for the process to run its course), and it reaffirms the importance of communist experience in explaining the low levels of post-communist organizational membership. Yet such a development may be far from assured, and it is difficult to predict whether or not generational change will contribute to an increase in participation in civil society in the long run. After all, socialization comes both from the current institutional setting and from one's parents, teachers, and peers, all of whom can contribute to reproducing the same patterns of attitudes and behavior, even if the original institutional environment is long gone."
Howard, Marc Morje. "The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society." Journal of Democracy. Vol 13 (1), January 2002.
"The first and most obvious potential mechanism is generational change, as younger post communist citizens less influenced by the experience of life in a communist system come of age. A group of people roughly the same age can be shaped not only by their common age or geography but by 'significant social events' such as war or economic depression. Piotr Sztompka argues that 'as long as the majority of the population consists of the people whose young, formative years, and therefore crucial socializing experiences fall under the rule of the communist regime-- one can expect the continuing vitality of the bloc culture.' He adds, however that this will change over time, as 'new demographic cohorts replace the older generations at the central positions in a society.' The expectation therefore is that those people who dislike and avoid voluntary organizations will eventually die off, replaced by younger generations that might be more sympathetic to such activities.
"The expectation that generational change will bring about a steady increase in organizational membership is certainly plausible (although not particularly encouraging, since even in the best conditions, it will take many decades for the process to run its course), and it reaffirms the importance of communist experience in explaining the low levels of post-communist organizational membership. Yet such a development may be far from assured, and it is difficult to predict whether or not generational change will contribute to an increase in participation in civil society in the long run. After all, socialization comes both from the current institutional setting and from one's parents, teachers, and peers, all of whom can contribute to reproducing the same patterns of attitudes and behavior, even if the original institutional environment is long gone."
Howard, Marc Morje. "The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society." Journal of Democracy. Vol 13 (1), January 2002.
Saturday, March 10, 2007
Life as Origami
From Jean Genet's Prisoner of Love, p. 171.
A chicken, boat, bird, dart or aeroplane such as schoolboys make out of bits of paper--if you unfold them carefully they bocome a page from a newspaper or a blank sheet of paper again. For a long time I'd been vaguely uneasy, but I was amazed when I realized that my life--I mean the events of my life, spread out flat in front of me--was nothing but a blank sheet of paper which I'd managed to fold into something different. Perhaps I was the only one who could see it in three dimensions, as a mountain, a precipice, a murder or a fatal accident.
Thursday, March 8, 2007
international women's day
Happy International Women's Day- it's the only day in Russia and Eastern Europe on which women get any respect at all.
Speaking of Russian women, Russia's female cosmonaut, Valentina Tereshkova turned 70 on Tuesday. Ms. Tereshkova, who blasted into space in 1963, also worked as a politician and diplomat during the Soviet Era. She is a national hero in Russia (according to some, second only to yuri gagarin), and has an astroid and moon crater named after her.
Speaking of Russian women, Russia's female cosmonaut, Valentina Tereshkova turned 70 on Tuesday. Ms. Tereshkova, who blasted into space in 1963, also worked as a politician and diplomat during the Soviet Era. She is a national hero in Russia (according to some, second only to yuri gagarin), and has an astroid and moon crater named after her.
If you build it . . .
The following is from the latest issue of the New York Review of Books (not yet up online, but perhaps I'll add a link once it is). Anyhow, I must say I'm a bit skeptical of Vaclav Havel (anybody who is the subject of the kind of hero worship that Havel is becomes automatically a bit suspect, in my opinion), but I very much agree with his opinion of a "Freedom Tower" as expressed in this piece from his forthcoming book, To the Castle and Back.
Let's set the scene:
Let's set the scene:
Gov. Eliot Spitzer announced yesterday that he supported going ahead with construction of the Freedom Tower at ground zero, making official his change of mind about a project that he once called a white elephant.Havel writes:
(the New York Times, 21 February 2007)
19 May 2005
I have to admit to something I don't know whether I can actually say here: I absolutely hated those two skyscrapers at the World Trade Center. They were a typical kind of architecture that has no ideas behind it. Moreover, they disrupted the skyline of the city; they towered absurdly over the beautiful crystalline topography of Manhattan. They were two monuments to the cult of profit at any cost: regardless of what they looked like, they had to have the greatest imaginable number of square meters of office space. I was once on the top floor of one of those buildings for dinner, and I discovered that the entire edifice was constantly swaying slightly. I took it as a sign that something was not right and that something was going on here that was, in a sense, against nature. A boat may sway, but a building should not. The view down was dull; it was no longer the view from a skyscraper and it wasn't yet the view from an aircraft.
And here's what I fear: that for reasons of prestige they will build something even higher on the same spot, something that will spoil New York even more, that will enter into some kind of absurd competition with the terrorists; and who will win in the end, the suicidal fanatics or an even higher Tower of Babel? You have to fight against terrorists with armies, the police, the intelligence services; their sympathizers have to be dealt with by politicians, political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists. Buildings, however, should be erected to enrich human settlements, not to make them duller. Why couldn't new buildings be put up on that spot proportional to the buildings already there, and that would simply blend into the existing skyline? Likewise, I don't think that some bombastic monument should be erected at Ground Zero. What happened there must be commemorated, but tastefully, as the fallen from the Vietnam or Korean wars are commemorated in Washington, or simply with a single large space or room that would evoke the catastrophe and its context.
Sunday, February 25, 2007
coldness
Yesterday (February 24) was the anniversary of Estonia's first independence. Every year on Freedom Square, Tallinn holds a huge parade, but this year- because of the cold (it went down to -22 degrees F on Friday night)- it was cancelled. Too cold for the musicians to play, according to Eesti Paevaleht.
Wednesday, February 14, 2007
Monday, February 12, 2007
constructed identities: historical, complementary, conflictual
In 1995, Estonian politician and artist Jaak Olep told Postimees:
'The historical frontier of Estonia is not only an interstate border, but one part of the long boundary line running between the Western Christian and Eastern Orthodox civilisations' (Olep, PM, 5 January 2005).
A month later, the Electoral Union Better Estonia-Estonia Citizen noted:
'...Let us keep in mind how the Second World War broke out and how the Estonian Republic was annexed. Thereby, the present control line must be controlled and defended even more rigorously than state borders' (Parem Eesti-Eesti Kodanik, RH, 13 February 1995).
The same year, Estonian president Lennart Meri argued that '...Estonia has been part of the Roman-Germanic legal system for over 700 years... This legal basis... is a nursery where everything else springs up; it is the prerequisite, the basis and the very guarantor of the survival, the development and the sucess of our modern state.' (Meri, 1995b).
Here we can see three attempts to construct the Estonian post-Soviet identity: along the lines of the conflicting other (internal as well as external, as it is defined along lines of 'civilisations'), as a historical construction (Estonia as a victim to both East and West aggression), and along the lines of the complementary other (Europe as different, but still similar, in 'legal' ways). Although these identity sentiments have died down a bit in recent years, they still play into conflicts such as the (seemingly endless) discourse surrounding the Russian-Estonian border, attempts to integrate the Russian speaking community into Estonian society, and day to day debates over, for example, whether to remove the bronze soldier statue.
Speaking of the bronze soldier statue, I passed it this morning on my way to the Estonian National Library, where I am sitting right now, and is decorated quite elegantly with red carnations.
'The historical frontier of Estonia is not only an interstate border, but one part of the long boundary line running between the Western Christian and Eastern Orthodox civilisations' (Olep, PM, 5 January 2005).
A month later, the Electoral Union Better Estonia-Estonia Citizen noted:
'...Let us keep in mind how the Second World War broke out and how the Estonian Republic was annexed. Thereby, the present control line must be controlled and defended even more rigorously than state borders' (Parem Eesti-Eesti Kodanik, RH, 13 February 1995).
The same year, Estonian president Lennart Meri argued that '...Estonia has been part of the Roman-Germanic legal system for over 700 years... This legal basis... is a nursery where everything else springs up; it is the prerequisite, the basis and the very guarantor of the survival, the development and the sucess of our modern state.' (Meri, 1995b).
Here we can see three attempts to construct the Estonian post-Soviet identity: along the lines of the conflicting other (internal as well as external, as it is defined along lines of 'civilisations'), as a historical construction (Estonia as a victim to both East and West aggression), and along the lines of the complementary other (Europe as different, but still similar, in 'legal' ways). Although these identity sentiments have died down a bit in recent years, they still play into conflicts such as the (seemingly endless) discourse surrounding the Russian-Estonian border, attempts to integrate the Russian speaking community into Estonian society, and day to day debates over, for example, whether to remove the bronze soldier statue.
Speaking of the bronze soldier statue, I passed it this morning on my way to the Estonian National Library, where I am sitting right now, and is decorated quite elegantly with red carnations.
“It’s a man’s world, sweetie, and the sooner you learn that the better off you’ll be.”
thus spoke the mother of drew gilpen faust.
much has been discussed in the media over the weekend about the naming of harvard's twenty-eight (and first female) president, dr. drew gilpen faust. although i tend to object to over-emphasizing 'firsts,' i am quite happy about this choice, whether or not she has a uterus. dr. faust, the civil war historian and president of the radcliffe institute at harvard, was educated at bryn mawr and penn, and was a professor of history at penn for 25 years. she is a feminist and civil rights activist, starting at the age of nine, when she wrote a letter to president eisenhower asking him to end segregation. i am confident that dr. faust will cease to suggest that differences in 'innate abilities' help to explain why more men become scientists or engineers than women.
the only distressing thing i find about this choice is not the choice itself (although as mr. anarchov pointed out, it might not be the best PR move to have your university president named dr. faust) but the fact that it took an institution that is 140 years older than the country to choose a female president. will it be another 140 years before the american public is ready for a female president?
much has been discussed in the media over the weekend about the naming of harvard's twenty-eight (and first female) president, dr. drew gilpen faust. although i tend to object to over-emphasizing 'firsts,' i am quite happy about this choice, whether or not she has a uterus. dr. faust, the civil war historian and president of the radcliffe institute at harvard, was educated at bryn mawr and penn, and was a professor of history at penn for 25 years. she is a feminist and civil rights activist, starting at the age of nine, when she wrote a letter to president eisenhower asking him to end segregation. i am confident that dr. faust will cease to suggest that differences in 'innate abilities' help to explain why more men become scientists or engineers than women.
the only distressing thing i find about this choice is not the choice itself (although as mr. anarchov pointed out, it might not be the best PR move to have your university president named dr. faust) but the fact that it took an institution that is 140 years older than the country to choose a female president. will it be another 140 years before the american public is ready for a female president?
Friday, February 9, 2007
What Would the Lorax Do?
Joe Lieberman, a self-dubbed "Lorax" of "Islamist extremism," is the subject of a piece in the most recent issue of the New Yorker. In it, it is mentioned that Lieberman is reading America Alone,
I just wish that Joe Lieberman would pick himself up by the seat of his pants and carry himself away.
a book by the conservative commentator Mark Steyn, which argues that Europe is succumbing, demographically and culturally, to an onslaught by Islam, leaving America friendless in its confrontation with Islamic extremism.How dare he try to conflate the Lorax, that great Seussian speaker for the trees, with racism and Islamophobia. (I mean, let's be honest, "the power of demographics" is really just a way to talk in polite company about there being too damn many Arabs and Muslims.)
“The thing I quote most from it is the power of demographics, in Europe particularly,” Lieberman said. “That’s what struck me the most."
I just wish that Joe Lieberman would pick himself up by the seat of his pants and carry himself away.
Thursday, February 8, 2007
Possibility is not Probability
From Alexander Wendt's 'Constructing International Politics.' International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Summer, 1995).
"Mearsheimer thinks it significant that in anarchy, states cannot be
100 per cent certain that others will not attack. Yet even in domestic
society, I can not be certain that I will be safe walking to class.
There are no guarantees in life, domestic or international, but the
fact that in anarchy war is possible does not mean 'it may at any
moment occur' (Waltz 1959). Indeed, it may be quite unlikely, as it is
in most interactions today. Possibility is not probability. Anarchy as
such is not a structural cause of anything. What matters is its social
structure, which varies across anarchies. An anarchy of friends
differs from one of enemies, one of self-help from one of collective
security, and these are all constituted by structures of shared
knowledge. Mearsheimer does not provide an argument for why this is
wrong; he simply asserts that it is" (pp. 78-9).
"Mearsheimer thinks it significant that in anarchy, states cannot be
100 per cent certain that others will not attack. Yet even in domestic
society, I can not be certain that I will be safe walking to class.
There are no guarantees in life, domestic or international, but the
fact that in anarchy war is possible does not mean 'it may at any
moment occur' (Waltz 1959). Indeed, it may be quite unlikely, as it is
in most interactions today. Possibility is not probability. Anarchy as
such is not a structural cause of anything. What matters is its social
structure, which varies across anarchies. An anarchy of friends
differs from one of enemies, one of self-help from one of collective
security, and these are all constituted by structures of shared
knowledge. Mearsheimer does not provide an argument for why this is
wrong; he simply asserts that it is" (pp. 78-9).
sovereignty and civilization narratives in conflict
From Merje Kuus: 'European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security.' Journal of Peace Reseach, vol. 39. no I, 2002, p. 91-2:
'Security is the key concept in both the integration and sovereignty narratives. International integration, particularly membership in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is pursued as the ultimate expression and codification of Estonian identity and Estonian values, as well as a security guarantee for the preservation of Estonia's identity and independence. Security and identity are represented as Estonia's primary motives for integration; they are accorded higher priority than the anticipated economic benefits of the process. Yet the security threats invoked in the integration and sovereignty narratives contradict one another between as well as within these narratives. On one hand, Estonian identity is presented as a European or Western one, and similarities between Estonia and Western European countries are stressed. On the other hand, Estonian identity is presented in exclusively ethnic terms and linked to the territory of the nation state.'
Today, I also learned that Huntington's Clash of Civilization is the most cited academic text in Estonia. That said, I am late for my IR class.
'Security is the key concept in both the integration and sovereignty narratives. International integration, particularly membership in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is pursued as the ultimate expression and codification of Estonian identity and Estonian values, as well as a security guarantee for the preservation of Estonia's identity and independence. Security and identity are represented as Estonia's primary motives for integration; they are accorded higher priority than the anticipated economic benefits of the process. Yet the security threats invoked in the integration and sovereignty narratives contradict one another between as well as within these narratives. On one hand, Estonian identity is presented as a European or Western one, and similarities between Estonia and Western European countries are stressed. On the other hand, Estonian identity is presented in exclusively ethnic terms and linked to the territory of the nation state.'
Today, I also learned that Huntington's Clash of Civilization is the most cited academic text in Estonia. That said, I am late for my IR class.
Wednesday, February 7, 2007
Eternal Love?
I was browsing the al-Jazeera English site and came across an article on the archaeological find in Italy of two 5,000 to 6,000-year-old skeletons of a young man and woman embracing (see photo below).
All I'm saying is that a discovery like this (unprecedented according to the dig team leader), a week before Valentine's Day? I'm sure there are some people with dollar signs in their eyes making that "ka-ching" sound right now!
All I'm saying is that a discovery like this (unprecedented according to the dig team leader), a week before Valentine's Day? I'm sure there are some people with dollar signs in their eyes making that "ka-ching" sound right now!
Politics of Credibility
I recently read 'Power and Interdependence in the Information Age'(Foreign Affairs 77(5): 81-94) by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. The two authors argue that, with the rise of the information technology revolution, geographic states as the dominant actor in international relations will 'continue to structure politics' but state power 'will rely less on material resources and more on their ability to remain credible to a public with increasingly diverse sources of information' (p. 94). Although I agree that the information technology revolution will not deem the nation state irrelevant in IR, there is a fundamental flaw in arguing that credibility brings power, when in fact credibility is a subjective term, perceptions of what is credible can easily be molded by actors holding the most material resources. Their theory illustrates credibility as the independent variable, and power as dependent on credibility, where as, in reality power is the independent variable, on which credibility is dependent. Maybe that sounds too cynical. What can you do, it's February in Estonia.
Thursday, February 1, 2007
Artistic Freedom?
While perusing the New York Times' Arts section yesterday, I was startled to find an article on the tension raised by a piece (pdf) written by American Jewish Committee executive director David A. Harris as the introduction for an AJC publication focused on the role of "Progressive" Jews (their quotes, not mine) in forwarding the "new anti-Semitism" (i.e., criticism of Israeli policy). I have tons to say about the actual content of the AJC's publication and the equating of criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism (the equivalent of saying that criticism of Mugabe's "land reform" in Zimbabwe is tantamount to racism), but a significant issue, in my eyes, is that this was published in the Arts section of the Times. I'm sorry, but I fail to see any connection whatsoever to the arts (the only tenuous thread I can think of is that Tony Kushner is among those called out in the publication as aiding and abetting anti-Semitism). Why wouldn't this be much better suited for the politics section?
Anyhow, I apologize for the non-Estonia-related post, but I guess it's relevant to ethnic democracy, right?
Anyhow, I apologize for the non-Estonia-related post, but I guess it's relevant to ethnic democracy, right?
Wednesday, January 31, 2007
From Molen and Novikova's "Mainstreaming Gender in the EU-Accession Process":
"The labour markets in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia have exposed how the 'happy marraige' of a neo-liberal economic framework and neo-conservative gender ideology is in reality a restatement of women's political, social and economic disempowerment through the politics of exclusion in terms of age, ethnicity, and class. The economic 'transition' processes have demonstrated tat the familiar concepts of the liberal democratic state are 'neither neutral nor impartial in the way in which they operate. Instead, they work in favour of some interests and against others. One of the groups to suffer disproportionately is that of women and it is because of this that the use of mainstreaming can be justified in order to redress this balance' (Beveridge, et al., 2000: 386)."
and
"With the break-up of the Soviet approach, women experienced downward social mobility in the early and mid-1990s. In particular, women from Russian-speaking minorities, who lacked citizenship in Estonia and Latvia, faced the most severe hardships. Some of these women, who were excluded from employment in the formal economy, found jobs in the informal sectors where their rights were much less protected than in the formal economy. Ther roles were marginalized to those of a mother, and low-paid employee in the local 'shadow economy', or a potential body for the lucrative sex-trafficking business into the European Union (Novikova, 2002:8). Due to their increased insecurity and the lack of future prospects, there has been a strong growth in the number of women in the transition countries involved in the sex industy (Huland, 2001:2). Stukulis and Wennerholm both point out that, due to constraints on finding formal employment , there are large numbers of Russian women working as prostitues in Riga and Tallinn (Stukulis, 2004: 221-2; Wennerholm, 2002:12)."
"The labour markets in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia have exposed how the 'happy marraige' of a neo-liberal economic framework and neo-conservative gender ideology is in reality a restatement of women's political, social and economic disempowerment through the politics of exclusion in terms of age, ethnicity, and class. The economic 'transition' processes have demonstrated tat the familiar concepts of the liberal democratic state are 'neither neutral nor impartial in the way in which they operate. Instead, they work in favour of some interests and against others. One of the groups to suffer disproportionately is that of women and it is because of this that the use of mainstreaming can be justified in order to redress this balance' (Beveridge, et al., 2000: 386)."
and
"With the break-up of the Soviet approach, women experienced downward social mobility in the early and mid-1990s. In particular, women from Russian-speaking minorities, who lacked citizenship in Estonia and Latvia, faced the most severe hardships. Some of these women, who were excluded from employment in the formal economy, found jobs in the informal sectors where their rights were much less protected than in the formal economy. Ther roles were marginalized to those of a mother, and low-paid employee in the local 'shadow economy', or a potential body for the lucrative sex-trafficking business into the European Union (Novikova, 2002:8). Due to their increased insecurity and the lack of future prospects, there has been a strong growth in the number of women in the transition countries involved in the sex industy (Huland, 2001:2). Stukulis and Wennerholm both point out that, due to constraints on finding formal employment , there are large numbers of Russian women working as prostitues in Riga and Tallinn (Stukulis, 2004: 221-2; Wennerholm, 2002:12)."
Tuesday, January 30, 2007
Adi Aria's Double Wooden Spatula Pancakes
There’s nothing Sofia Rodina loves more about Estonia than its delectable pancakes. The pancakes are thinner and lighter in texture than American pancakes but thicker than crepes, and are perfect for a savory lunch (with, for example, beetroot and feta), a sweet dinner or breakfast (served with jam, sweet cream, or fresh berries), or a fulfilling dessert (served with ice cream, of course). I suggest eating them with honey and sour cream.
Some say, and we agree, that Estonian pancakes are healthier than American pancakes as well. The following recipe is a particularly healthy variation of the traditional Estonian pancake, as it is made with whole wheat, ginger, and two kick-ass wooden spatulas, Adi Aria’s favorite kitchen utensils. The recipe is perfect for Tuesday night movie dates, especially during the long Estonian winter.
The amount of flour and milk used depends on the discretion of the cook. Traditional Estonian pancakes are about 1 mm thick. If the batter is too thick, the inside might be undercooked. Thus, it is important to create a batter that is thin, much thinner than the batter of American pancakes, just slightly thicker than liquid.
Ingredients:
3 eggs
7 parts whole-wheat flour
3 parts all purpose flour
Milk
1 cup sugar
Pinch of Salt
1 tablespoon ground fresh ginger
1 teaspoon cardamom
1 teaspoon cinnamon
Combine all of the ingredients besides the milk in a large bowl. Mix. Slowly add the milk, until the consistency of the batter is as discussed above. Let the mixture sit for 30 minutes.
After 30 minutes, add a small amount of oil to a flat, round pan. Take a small amount of the batter, spread it out to the edges of the pan, and cook until golden on each side. Because of the thinness of the pancakes, the cooking should not take too long. Serve immediately (or place on a plate to keep in a slightly heated oven, if making a number of pancakes, which of course, we highly suggest).
Some say, and we agree, that Estonian pancakes are healthier than American pancakes as well. The following recipe is a particularly healthy variation of the traditional Estonian pancake, as it is made with whole wheat, ginger, and two kick-ass wooden spatulas, Adi Aria’s favorite kitchen utensils. The recipe is perfect for Tuesday night movie dates, especially during the long Estonian winter.
The amount of flour and milk used depends on the discretion of the cook. Traditional Estonian pancakes are about 1 mm thick. If the batter is too thick, the inside might be undercooked. Thus, it is important to create a batter that is thin, much thinner than the batter of American pancakes, just slightly thicker than liquid.
Ingredients:
3 eggs
7 parts whole-wheat flour
3 parts all purpose flour
Milk
1 cup sugar
Pinch of Salt
1 tablespoon ground fresh ginger
1 teaspoon cardamom
1 teaspoon cinnamon
Combine all of the ingredients besides the milk in a large bowl. Mix. Slowly add the milk, until the consistency of the batter is as discussed above. Let the mixture sit for 30 minutes.
After 30 minutes, add a small amount of oil to a flat, round pan. Take a small amount of the batter, spread it out to the edges of the pan, and cook until golden on each side. Because of the thinness of the pancakes, the cooking should not take too long. Serve immediately (or place on a plate to keep in a slightly heated oven, if making a number of pancakes, which of course, we highly suggest).
perspectives on youth activism
One of the projects that I have been working on in Estonia examines
youth attitudes towards government, civil society, activism, and
Estonia's experience with post-communism. Over the past week, I
interviewed two extremely bright and accomplished young men from the
youth wing of the Social Democratic political party. My first
interview was with Laur Kiik, the head of membership of the youth
wing. Mr. Kiik, 19, is a student of Asian Studies at Tallinn
University. My second interview was with Gerd Tarand, 21, who is the
Secretary General of the Social Democratic youth wing, the Tallinn
city Executive Branch director for the neighborhood of Mustamae, and a
student of International Affairs at Euro University in Tallinn. Both
men spoke a mile a minute and were very enthusiastic to discuss
Estonia, politics, and youth activism.
Being from the same political party, one that supports social welfare,
equality, justice, and solidarity, the two men had similar opinions on
a number of issues. They both agreed that education was the most
important issue for discussion among the youth political wings. Mr.
Tarand told me that this issue is so important that it creates a
tremendous amount of contention between the different youth wing
groups. The Social Democratic youth, for example, support free public
university education as well as an increase in the student salary
(Estonian students receive 3000 to 4000 EEK [$250 to $330 per month]
from the state to cover living expenses). In contrast, the Reform
party (highly libertarian and right-leaning) calls for easier access
for students to be able to take out loans, while other parties stand
somewhere between the two. Another issue of contention revolves around
the teaching of world religions in high school, a subject the Social
Democratic youth believe should be enlarged to cover culture in
general. When asked what it means to be an Estonian, both men agreed
that being Estonian has nothing to do with language acquisition or
ethnicity, but a desire to be Estonian. Although Mr. Tarand believes
that the Russian minority should be trying harder to learn Estonian,
both agreed that the state should be doing more to accommodate the
Russian-speaking population.
The two men also agreed on the role of the youth wing in relation to
the parent wing. As the Secretary General of the youth wing, Mr.
Tarand is invited to participate in all members of the parent party at
the Parliament buildings and at the party headquarters. Often they
feel as though the youth wing has much more of an influence in
domestic issues, especially issues pertaining to youth, rather than
foreign relations. They both agreed that the youth wing has been much
more radical than their parent party, and this has caused a number of
changes in the parent party. For example, before being called the
Social Democrats, the party was known as the Estonian Moderates (as,
for the obvious reasons, "social"-anything in Estonia is something
that is viewed with skepticism). It was the youth wing that changed
its name to the Social Democrats, and the parent party followed suit.
Both men noted that the youth party was the first to call for gay
rights and support the Tallinn Pride parade 2004. It was not until
after this youth wing initiative that the parent party began
supporting gay rights. Estonia has the least tolerant policies towards
homosexuals in Europe- many Estonian politicians have called
homosexuality a "problem" and have failed to create and administer
initiatives to protect single-sex families. One of the most active
members of the Social Democratic youth wing is Ardi Ravalepik,
president of the Estonian Gay League, and Social Democratic candidate
for Parliament in the upcoming elections. The move of the Social
Democratic parent party to support gay rights would have never
happened if it had not been for the activism and involvement of the
youth wings, according to the two men.
Although Mr. Kiik and Mr. Tarand had similar views on the above
discussed topics, there was one topic about which their opinions were
on complete opposite ends of the spectrum: youth activism, and even
more broadly, activism in Estonia. In our interview, Mr. Kiik
lamented, "there is a lack of political awareness among young people,
and much of what does exist is influenced by the media." He noted that
Estonian youth were the most passive in Europe, extending beyond
political activism to engagement in sports and social events as well.
He said, while youth political organizations may have a large
membership pool, the actual participation levels are small and "there
is really only a small group of young people who are actually doing
something."
"To be an activist in Estonia is not a good word," Mr. Kiik continued.
"It is very much a part of our society to be passive. There are three
major causes of this trend: Estonian self-mythology, our history under
Soviet Occupation, and, of course, the climate."
Mr. Kiik explained that Estonian "self-mythology" is one of a quiet,
passive nature. "We see from the American media that we are not like
the rest of the world, and we are constantly made aware that our norms
of personality are very different. Being passive is a way of asserting
our culture, and but it can also be used as an excuse." He continued
that the Soviet system really stripped Estonians the motivation to
become involved in government parties. "Bad connotations attached to
the state shape Estonians very much," he noted. He believes that the
climate also contributes to the Estonian desire to hide from political
activities, but jokingly predicted "maybe this will end with global
warming."
Mr. Tarand could not disagree with Mr. Kiik on this issue more.
Although he stated that "the word 'politician' carries a very negative
connotation, that youth involvement in Estonian politics has become
very strong in recent years. "Seven years ago, young people did not
have a voice," he began. "Now, on domestic issues, the youth
organizations have a very cooperative and engaged relationship with
the government- we are listened to, we are kept up-to-date and aware
of policies that are being discussed in the Parliament, and we are
allowed to take an active role in issues that pertain to young people,
such as education."
He attributed political activism among young people in Estonia to the
decades the country was forced to follow orders from Moscow.
Describing what he called "rebel feelings," Mr. Tarand explained
"Estonian youth are reluctant to have role models. They want to find
out everything and anything for themselves." He said that although
Estonia often represents a small percentage of participants in
meetings with other European youth, they tend to be more radical and
active in the meetings. He said that it constantly amazes him "how
old" his counterparts in Finland seem. They are much older than him of
course- the average age of the Finnish Social Democratic Youth is 27,
where as this is the average age as one of the parent parties in
Estonia (Res Publica) is- but in general, they are also much more
conservative and "much less relaxed."
Although it is very difficult to quantify youth political and social
activism, from my experience, I imagine that the reality is somewhere
in the center. Although there is a definite presence of Estonian youth
political activism in Tallinn and Tartu, especially, I am also aware
of a disenchantment and distrust of the political system that runs
throughout the entire population. Voter turnout is among the lowest in
Europe, for example. And like anywhere, many young people exhibit
general apathetic behavior. My students, for example, couldn't care
less about Estonian politics. That said, youth in Estonia who choose
to become involved in the political system have much greater
involvement and wider influence than in America or in Western Europe.
youth attitudes towards government, civil society, activism, and
Estonia's experience with post-communism. Over the past week, I
interviewed two extremely bright and accomplished young men from the
youth wing of the Social Democratic political party. My first
interview was with Laur Kiik, the head of membership of the youth
wing. Mr. Kiik, 19, is a student of Asian Studies at Tallinn
University. My second interview was with Gerd Tarand, 21, who is the
Secretary General of the Social Democratic youth wing, the Tallinn
city Executive Branch director for the neighborhood of Mustamae, and a
student of International Affairs at Euro University in Tallinn. Both
men spoke a mile a minute and were very enthusiastic to discuss
Estonia, politics, and youth activism.
Being from the same political party, one that supports social welfare,
equality, justice, and solidarity, the two men had similar opinions on
a number of issues. They both agreed that education was the most
important issue for discussion among the youth political wings. Mr.
Tarand told me that this issue is so important that it creates a
tremendous amount of contention between the different youth wing
groups. The Social Democratic youth, for example, support free public
university education as well as an increase in the student salary
(Estonian students receive 3000 to 4000 EEK [$250 to $330 per month]
from the state to cover living expenses). In contrast, the Reform
party (highly libertarian and right-leaning) calls for easier access
for students to be able to take out loans, while other parties stand
somewhere between the two. Another issue of contention revolves around
the teaching of world religions in high school, a subject the Social
Democratic youth believe should be enlarged to cover culture in
general. When asked what it means to be an Estonian, both men agreed
that being Estonian has nothing to do with language acquisition or
ethnicity, but a desire to be Estonian. Although Mr. Tarand believes
that the Russian minority should be trying harder to learn Estonian,
both agreed that the state should be doing more to accommodate the
Russian-speaking population.
The two men also agreed on the role of the youth wing in relation to
the parent wing. As the Secretary General of the youth wing, Mr.
Tarand is invited to participate in all members of the parent party at
the Parliament buildings and at the party headquarters. Often they
feel as though the youth wing has much more of an influence in
domestic issues, especially issues pertaining to youth, rather than
foreign relations. They both agreed that the youth wing has been much
more radical than their parent party, and this has caused a number of
changes in the parent party. For example, before being called the
Social Democrats, the party was known as the Estonian Moderates (as,
for the obvious reasons, "social"-anything in Estonia is something
that is viewed with skepticism). It was the youth wing that changed
its name to the Social Democrats, and the parent party followed suit.
Both men noted that the youth party was the first to call for gay
rights and support the Tallinn Pride parade 2004. It was not until
after this youth wing initiative that the parent party began
supporting gay rights. Estonia has the least tolerant policies towards
homosexuals in Europe- many Estonian politicians have called
homosexuality a "problem" and have failed to create and administer
initiatives to protect single-sex families. One of the most active
members of the Social Democratic youth wing is Ardi Ravalepik,
president of the Estonian Gay League, and Social Democratic candidate
for Parliament in the upcoming elections. The move of the Social
Democratic parent party to support gay rights would have never
happened if it had not been for the activism and involvement of the
youth wings, according to the two men.
Although Mr. Kiik and Mr. Tarand had similar views on the above
discussed topics, there was one topic about which their opinions were
on complete opposite ends of the spectrum: youth activism, and even
more broadly, activism in Estonia. In our interview, Mr. Kiik
lamented, "there is a lack of political awareness among young people,
and much of what does exist is influenced by the media." He noted that
Estonian youth were the most passive in Europe, extending beyond
political activism to engagement in sports and social events as well.
He said, while youth political organizations may have a large
membership pool, the actual participation levels are small and "there
is really only a small group of young people who are actually doing
something."
"To be an activist in Estonia is not a good word," Mr. Kiik continued.
"It is very much a part of our society to be passive. There are three
major causes of this trend: Estonian self-mythology, our history under
Soviet Occupation, and, of course, the climate."
Mr. Kiik explained that Estonian "self-mythology" is one of a quiet,
passive nature. "We see from the American media that we are not like
the rest of the world, and we are constantly made aware that our norms
of personality are very different. Being passive is a way of asserting
our culture, and but it can also be used as an excuse." He continued
that the Soviet system really stripped Estonians the motivation to
become involved in government parties. "Bad connotations attached to
the state shape Estonians very much," he noted. He believes that the
climate also contributes to the Estonian desire to hide from political
activities, but jokingly predicted "maybe this will end with global
warming."
Mr. Tarand could not disagree with Mr. Kiik on this issue more.
Although he stated that "the word 'politician' carries a very negative
connotation, that youth involvement in Estonian politics has become
very strong in recent years. "Seven years ago, young people did not
have a voice," he began. "Now, on domestic issues, the youth
organizations have a very cooperative and engaged relationship with
the government- we are listened to, we are kept up-to-date and aware
of policies that are being discussed in the Parliament, and we are
allowed to take an active role in issues that pertain to young people,
such as education."
He attributed political activism among young people in Estonia to the
decades the country was forced to follow orders from Moscow.
Describing what he called "rebel feelings," Mr. Tarand explained
"Estonian youth are reluctant to have role models. They want to find
out everything and anything for themselves." He said that although
Estonia often represents a small percentage of participants in
meetings with other European youth, they tend to be more radical and
active in the meetings. He said that it constantly amazes him "how
old" his counterparts in Finland seem. They are much older than him of
course- the average age of the Finnish Social Democratic Youth is 27,
where as this is the average age as one of the parent parties in
Estonia (Res Publica) is- but in general, they are also much more
conservative and "much less relaxed."
Although it is very difficult to quantify youth political and social
activism, from my experience, I imagine that the reality is somewhere
in the center. Although there is a definite presence of Estonian youth
political activism in Tallinn and Tartu, especially, I am also aware
of a disenchantment and distrust of the political system that runs
throughout the entire population. Voter turnout is among the lowest in
Europe, for example. And like anywhere, many young people exhibit
general apathetic behavior. My students, for example, couldn't care
less about Estonian politics. That said, youth in Estonia who choose
to become involved in the political system have much greater
involvement and wider influence than in America or in Western Europe.
Monday, January 29, 2007
Where will Estonia be in ten years? A vacant planet?
I asked my students in what direction Estonia is heading over the next ten years. Once again, all of the responses were amazing, but one was particularly, um, particular:
"Where do I think Estonia will be in 10 years time?
"Well, frankly, I have no idea. I've read that according to the ancient Mayans a new age should begin with the year 2012. I've also read that, according to the UK-based post-black metal band Anaal Natrakh, the apocalyspe should arrive in 2012 (actually they said that some hippie had a vision in the 1960s or 1970s in a Southern American jungle, during which some alien life form [or possibly life forms] contact him and implied that the year 2012 sees the destruction of the world as we know it). Come to think of it, the apocalypse could also qualify as the beginning of a new age, since nothing would remain of the old age...
"Anyway, even if we survive the year 2012 without any kind of cataclysms or 'new ages,' it's still pretty hard for me to predict the future. But I suppose I could try. I think that as the welfare level continues to increase more and more, people will discover that they suddenly need about 14 houses and 15 cars, since the welfare level would arise more so more people could actually afford 14 houses and 15 cars. People would still moan about low birthrate, though there are about 1.3 million human beings inhabiting the place known to us as Estonia, which is frankly too much considering that Estonians' 'ecological footprint' is quite 'oversized' [excuse the lame pun, I know it wasn't funny, but somehow I still had to make it]. Also I think that probably Tallinn will grow too big, and we will pollute 'our' nature with our garbage, but it doesn't matter in the big picture, because then some halfwit would start a nuclear war or we would possibly find another 2017 ways to destroy the world we live in, wipe out human population on earth, and leave behind a vacant planet. Brave New World indeed."
I love Estonia, I really do.
"Where do I think Estonia will be in 10 years time?
"Well, frankly, I have no idea. I've read that according to the ancient Mayans a new age should begin with the year 2012. I've also read that, according to the UK-based post-black metal band Anaal Natrakh, the apocalyspe should arrive in 2012 (actually they said that some hippie had a vision in the 1960s or 1970s in a Southern American jungle, during which some alien life form [or possibly life forms] contact him and implied that the year 2012 sees the destruction of the world as we know it). Come to think of it, the apocalypse could also qualify as the beginning of a new age, since nothing would remain of the old age...
"Anyway, even if we survive the year 2012 without any kind of cataclysms or 'new ages,' it's still pretty hard for me to predict the future. But I suppose I could try. I think that as the welfare level continues to increase more and more, people will discover that they suddenly need about 14 houses and 15 cars, since the welfare level would arise more so more people could actually afford 14 houses and 15 cars. People would still moan about low birthrate, though there are about 1.3 million human beings inhabiting the place known to us as Estonia, which is frankly too much considering that Estonians' 'ecological footprint' is quite 'oversized' [excuse the lame pun, I know it wasn't funny, but somehow I still had to make it]. Also I think that probably Tallinn will grow too big, and we will pollute 'our' nature with our garbage, but it doesn't matter in the big picture, because then some halfwit would start a nuclear war or we would possibly find another 2017 ways to destroy the world we live in, wipe out human population on earth, and leave behind a vacant planet. Brave New World indeed."
I love Estonia, I really do.
Do Nations Have Navels?
From Ernest Gellner's Nationalism (p 96-97):
"The Estonians, for example, are a fine example of highly sucessful navel-free nationalism. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, they did not really exist as a self-conscious category: they could only refer to themselves as 'those who lived on the land', in distinction to Swedish or German burghers or Russian bureaucrats. There wasn't even an ethnonym.
"However, just as the previously operative conditions of agrarian society permitted or favored domination by a tiny alien minority, now the conditions of modern life favoured the demographic majority, however unfavorable its political baseline. A national culture was born, by the usual nineteenth-century methods (national theatre, museum, education). The process was brilliantly successful and very thorough: the ethnographic museum in Tartu, for instance, has approximately one cultural object for every ten Estonians, and is sustained by a conscientious network of informants. Estonian culture is not in peril: rates of literacy, the level of education and general consciousness are extremely high. Political independence was secured on the collapse of the Tsarist empire and recovered on the collapse of the Bolshevik one. The fact that there is no historic precident for a linkage of Estonian culture with a state does not matter in the least: this nationalism is so brazenly devoid of any navel that it does not even deign to invent one, and yet the national culture iss so vigorous as to be in no danger at all, and the political will accompanying it is also strong and effective."
"The Estonians, for example, are a fine example of highly sucessful navel-free nationalism. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, they did not really exist as a self-conscious category: they could only refer to themselves as 'those who lived on the land', in distinction to Swedish or German burghers or Russian bureaucrats. There wasn't even an ethnonym.
"However, just as the previously operative conditions of agrarian society permitted or favored domination by a tiny alien minority, now the conditions of modern life favoured the demographic majority, however unfavorable its political baseline. A national culture was born, by the usual nineteenth-century methods (national theatre, museum, education). The process was brilliantly successful and very thorough: the ethnographic museum in Tartu, for instance, has approximately one cultural object for every ten Estonians, and is sustained by a conscientious network of informants. Estonian culture is not in peril: rates of literacy, the level of education and general consciousness are extremely high. Political independence was secured on the collapse of the Tsarist empire and recovered on the collapse of the Bolshevik one. The fact that there is no historic precident for a linkage of Estonian culture with a state does not matter in the least: this nationalism is so brazenly devoid of any navel that it does not even deign to invent one, and yet the national culture iss so vigorous as to be in no danger at all, and the political will accompanying it is also strong and effective."
Saturday, January 27, 2007
russian speakers and freedom of movement in the EU
A lot has been discussed on the effect that Estonian accession into the European Union has had on the Russian population. Prior to the September 2003 referendum, the Russian population living in Estonia had a more positive opinion towards E.U. accession. This can be attributed to three factors: (1) the Russian population felt less connected to the Estonian state, thus they were less concerned about a potential loss of sovereignty following accession; (2) the socio-economic gap between Russians and other member states was greater than the socio-economic gap between Estonians and other member states, thus the Russians saw greater potential for increased living conditions; and (3) [probably most significantly] the Russian population saw opportunity for their economic, political, and social standing to increase with the EU system of conditionality towards Estonia.
However, by 2001, ethnic Estonian favorability towards the EU increased as ethnic Russian favorability decreased. The Russian decrease could be viewed as a result of many different, simultaneously occurring circumstances, including increased amounts of anti-Russian propaganda issued by the Estonian government, a fear that a move towards the west would make family, business, and personal connections with Russia more challenging, and a fear of the increase in prices following accession. In the end, ethnic Russian were considerably less favorable towards EU accession than ethnic Estonians.
In the end, hopes for a major improvement in the living conditions of the ethnic Russians were let down, because the European Union did not hold Estonia accountable for appropriately handling the situations of the Russian minority. However, it is important to acknowledge one extremely important benefit that the Russian population (especially the non-citizen portion of the population) will gain from Estonia joining the EU: when the EU transitional provisions end (most likely 2009) and Schengen border system goes into effect, all residents of Estonia- Russian or Estonian, citizen or non-citizen- will be provided with the right of free travel throughout the entire European Union.
However, by 2001, ethnic Estonian favorability towards the EU increased as ethnic Russian favorability decreased. The Russian decrease could be viewed as a result of many different, simultaneously occurring circumstances, including increased amounts of anti-Russian propaganda issued by the Estonian government, a fear that a move towards the west would make family, business, and personal connections with Russia more challenging, and a fear of the increase in prices following accession. In the end, ethnic Russian were considerably less favorable towards EU accession than ethnic Estonians.
In the end, hopes for a major improvement in the living conditions of the ethnic Russians were let down, because the European Union did not hold Estonia accountable for appropriately handling the situations of the Russian minority. However, it is important to acknowledge one extremely important benefit that the Russian population (especially the non-citizen portion of the population) will gain from Estonia joining the EU: when the EU transitional provisions end (most likely 2009) and Schengen border system goes into effect, all residents of Estonia- Russian or Estonian, citizen or non-citizen- will be provided with the right of free travel throughout the entire European Union.
political tolerance
Political tolerance (when respondents allow the full legal rights of citizenshipto groups they themselve dislike) is particularly low in Estonia- much lower than in Russia. According to survey data, the least liked group in Estonia are the Stalinists and hard-lined communists. 2.1 per cent of Estonians would allow Stalinists and hard-lined communists to hold public office, 3.6 per cent of Estonians would allow this least-liked group to teach in schools, and 11 per cent would allow them to hold public ranking. in all of the former Soviet Countries, the averages are 5 per cent, 6.8 per cent, and 13.2 per cent.
Source: Geurin, Daniel. "Tolerance Protest and Democratic Transition: Survey evidence from 13 post-communist countries." European Journal of Political Research 43: 371-395, 2004.
Source: Geurin, Daniel. "Tolerance Protest and Democratic Transition: Survey evidence from 13 post-communist countries." European Journal of Political Research 43: 371-395, 2004.
Friday, January 26, 2007
Estonia in the News
The New York Times published an article this week examining the Bronze Soldier debate in Estonia:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/25/world/europe/25tallinn.html
I find Ilves's quote (“We don’t want to be weighed down by the past”) ironic because it is these memory politics on both sides that have a paralyzing and dividing effect on Estonian society and Estonian-Russian relations.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/25/world/europe/25tallinn.html
I find Ilves's quote (“We don’t want to be weighed down by the past”) ironic because it is these memory politics on both sides that have a paralyzing and dividing effect on Estonian society and Estonian-Russian relations.
Thursday, January 25, 2007
Nation as a Toy
I'm working on a book about my students at the Old Town School, and last week I asked them to write essays on how Estonia has changed in their lifetimes. The essays were all quite interesting, but I found one particularly creative:
"There are so many of us- the Children of the Singing Revolution. 1989, 1990- the Soviet Union begins to collapse; people of supressed countries fighting back an aggressor. These fighters made babies- lots and lots of babies, with hopes of saving the nation- exclaiming 'THERE ARE STILL ESTONIANS, AND,' with a threatening groan, 'THERE WILL BE MORE.'
"Here we are now. The lot of us. We don't remember the moment before Estonia regained independence. We vaguely remember how life was before. We know life if better now- we hear it every day. We are the children Estonia was given to- the Nation is our toy. We still don't play with it, though, for we are still too small. We play with our lives. Some know the rules and obey them, some bend them, some break them; and most of us break ourselves.
"We haven't been very good children: the more you expect, the less you receive. We don't appreciate what has been given to us, because it's the only reality we know."
"There are so many of us- the Children of the Singing Revolution. 1989, 1990- the Soviet Union begins to collapse; people of supressed countries fighting back an aggressor. These fighters made babies- lots and lots of babies, with hopes of saving the nation- exclaiming 'THERE ARE STILL ESTONIANS, AND,' with a threatening groan, 'THERE WILL BE MORE.'
"Here we are now. The lot of us. We don't remember the moment before Estonia regained independence. We vaguely remember how life was before. We know life if better now- we hear it every day. We are the children Estonia was given to- the Nation is our toy. We still don't play with it, though, for we are still too small. We play with our lives. Some know the rules and obey them, some bend them, some break them; and most of us break ourselves.
"We haven't been very good children: the more you expect, the less you receive. We don't appreciate what has been given to us, because it's the only reality we know."
Wednesday, January 24, 2007
apple-pomegranate birthday tart
Baking in Estonia can be quite a challenge- and finding the right ingredients to bake a birthday cake is impossible, especially in the winter time, when the fruit section of the grocery store is quite limited. Fortunately there is never a shortage of apples so I decided, for my friend Valerie's birthday, to make an apple-pomegranate birthday tart. It was quite fun, and the ingredients are extremely easy to find, even in the most limited of Eastern European grocery stores.
For the crust:
2 cups all purpose flour
1 teaspoon salt
3/4 cups butter (a bit more than 150 grams)
2 tbls heavy whipping cream
3 tbls water
For the filling:
3 large apples, sliced but not peeled
1 pomegranate
1/2 cup raspberry preserves
1 tbls butter
a bit of sugar, brown sugar, and cinnamon
Mix together the flour and salt in a large bowl. Add the butter. When the butter, salt, and flour combination are completely mixed, add the whipping cream and water. Mix to create a dough-like consistency. Let sit for an hour.
Pre-heat the oven to 350 degrees F (about 176 degrees C). When the hour is up, mold the dough into a tart shell and bake for 25 minutes, or until the shell is golden. While the shell is baking, melt the butter in a large sauce pan. Add the apples, some sugar and brown sugar. Cook the apples, turning occasionally, until they are soft all the way through. Cut the pomegranate in half and empty the seeds into a bowl with a spoon.
When the shell is finished baking, remove it from the oven and let it sit until it reaches room temperature. Spread a thin layer of raspberry preserves on the bottom of the tart. Lay the apple slices on top of the raspberry preserves in a fan-like pattern. When the tart is covered in apples, sprinkle the pomegranate seeds on top of the apples. Add a dash of cinnamon. You can serve it immediately or let it cool. Best served with a scoop of vanilla ice cream with brown sugar or cardamom. Enjoy!
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